I. Introduction
Picture the U.S. in 1800. The vast majority of the populace lived in rural areas; 94 percent did. The average white woman gave birth to 7 children. Now, move forward in time to 1940. Only 43 percent of the population lived in rural areas, and the average white woman birthed 2 kids. The demographic transition is shown in Figure 1 .
What was the force underlying this decline in fertility? The answer is technological progress. Two factors are relevant here. First, between 1800 and 1940 real wages grew about 5 fold. This increased the time cost of children in terms of consumption goods. America was sparsely populated as it entered the 19th century, just 4.5 people per square mile. Parts were "so thinly scattered" that one writer advised immigrants that "no assistance worthy of notice can be obtained from others outside of the family." So, children undoubtedly made an important contribution to the early household economy. With industrialization part of the utility flow accruing from children could be replaced less expensively by purchasing goods and services on the market.
Second, the role of agriculture in economy declined over this period. This contributed to the decline in fertility since, historically, women in the rural economy had a higher fertility rate than those in urban areas. In 1830 it took a farmer 250-330 hours to produce 100 bushels of wheat; by 1890 this was reduced to 40-50 hours with the help of a horse drawn machine; only 15-30 hours was required with the aid of a tractor in 1930; by 1975 large tractors and combines had reduced the labor input needed to just 3-4 hours. Similarly, it took 236 and 439 hours to produce a bushel of corn and bale of cotton in 1840. This had dropped to 8 and 32 hours by 1970. Less people were needed to feed the nation, given the relatively low income elasticity of agricultural goods. So while agriculture accounted for about 80 percent of the labor force in 1810, only about 30 percent of the population was employed in this sector by 1910, and just a paltry 2 percent in 1997. With economic progress other sectors of the economy began to outpace agriculture. Agriculture's share of output fell from 41 percent in 1840 to 2 percent in 1997.
II. The Model
Environment.-The world is described by a two-sector overlapping-generations model. An individual lives for three periods, one as a child and two as an adult. He consumes two goods: agricultural and manufacturing. The relative price of agricultural goods is p. Young adults work. They have one unit of time. Unskilled young adults earn the wage w, while skilled ones receive v. Each young adult must save for his old age since no one works when old. The gross interest rate on savings is r. A young adult must decide how many children, q, to have, and whether or not to skill them. There is a fixed cost, τ , associated with raising each child. Endowing a child with skills costs t units of time.
Tastes.-The lifetime utility function for a young adult is
with sgn(ζ)=sgn(ξ). Here c and c 0 denote the individual's consumption of manufactured goods when young and old, respectively, while a and a 0 represent consumption of agricultural goods. A person derives utility from the quantity, q, and quality of children. A parent picks the level of education, e ∈ {0, 1}, for his child; a choice of e = 1 corresponds with endowing the child with skills. Quality is measured by the wage that a child will earn as a young adult. A skilled child will earn v 0 when he grows up, while an unskilled kid will receive w 0 .
Technology.-Manufactured goods are produced in line with the Cobb-Douglas production technology
where o c denotes output, z is total factor productivity, and k c and s c are the inputs of capital and skilled labor. Agricultural goods production is governed the CES production function
where o a is output, x is total factor productivity, and k a , u a , and s a are the inputs of capital, unskilled labor and skilled labor. Observe that unskilled labor is used only in the agricultural sector. Manufacturing output can be used either for consumption or for capital accumulation. The aggregate stock of capital, k, evolves according to
where i is investment and δ is the factor of depreciation.
The Unskilled Parent.-The choice problem facing an unskilled parent with unskilled kids is
Denote the optimal number of children and the level of first-period savings that arise from this problem by q uu and b uu . Likewise, the problem facing a unskilled parent with skilled children will read
Represent this parent's optimal number of children and first-period savings by q us and b us . Clearly, all unskilled parents will choose to skill their children if V (w, w 0 , p, r) > U (w, w 0 , p, r), and all will choose not to when V (w, w 0 , p, r) < U(w, w 0 , p, r). If V (w, w 0 , p, r) = U (w, w 0 , p, r) then some unskilled parents may pick to skill their children while others don't. Skilled parents face a similar decision. Now, in the equilibrium modelled here the time path of wages adjusts so that all unskilled parents will be indifferent between endowing their children with skills or not. Skilled parents always (weakly) prefer to skill their offspring. Let q ss and b ss denote the number of children and level of savings that are chosen by a young skilled parent.
Population Dynamics.-Suppose the number of young adults is n. Out of this population some fraction µ will be unskilled, implying that the fraction 1 − µ will be skilled. Some fraction, σ, of unskilled parents will choose to endow their children with skills. Hence, the number of young adults next period, n 0 , will be given by
Analogously, the fraction who will be unskilled is
Firms.-Firms in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy are competitive and seek to maximize profits. They solve the problems max ka,ua,sa
These problems imply that all factors will get paid their marginal products.
Equilibrium.-In equilibrium various market-clearing conditions must hold. For instance, savings by the young must equal next period's capital stock, k 0 , so that
Likewise, the demand for unskilled labor must equal its supply implying
Observe that the supply of unskilled labor is reduced by the time young adults spend on childcare and education.
III. Findings
Can the model replicate the decline in fertility that occurred between 1800 and with economic development while the latter falls. The less concave utility is in manufactured goods (as measured by the exponent γ) the faster the marginal cost of a child will rise over time. The marginal benefit of a kid also rises with wages through the quality term, w 0ξ . The more concave utility is in child quality (i.e., the smaller is ξ), the less will be the benefit of an extra child as wages rise. Now, suppose that the marginal cost of children increases relative to the benefit. The drop off in fertility will be bigger the less concave utility is in child quantity, since marginal benefit then declines less in quantity. By making utility concave enough in child quality, at least relative to manufactured goods, a decline in fertility can be generated.
Additionally, less unskilled labor is needed as agriculture declines. Rural parents increasingly choose to skill their kids so that the latter can work in manufacturing.
Agriculture's share of income will decline faster, the more concave utility is in agriculture consumption relative to manufacturing consumption (or the smaller is ω versus γ). With economic progress wages rise, and this makes labor more expensive relative to capital. Increasingly expensive unskilled labor can be more easily be replaced by less-expensive capital, the greater is the degree of substitutability between capital and brawn in the agricultural production function. Hence, capital-brawn substitutability (or a high ρ) promotes rural-to-urban migration.
Last, the constant terms a and c in utility play a very important role in getting a high expenditure share for agricultural goods, and a low one for manufacturing contradicts the conventional wisdom that it either remained constant or rose. This is due to assumed degree of substitutability between capital and brawn in the production agricultural production function. With economic development, brawn is replaced by capital in agricultural production. Capital's share of income thus rises.
B. Transitional Dynamics
The analysis of comparative steady states suggests that the model may be capable of explaining the U.S. demographic transition. Will the drop off in fertility, however, be too fast or too slow? To answer this question, time paths for TFP similar to those found in the U.S. data for the 1800-1940 period are fed into the model. Specifically, let .77, 4.16, 4.58, 5.05, 5.57, 6.15, 6 .47, 1.95 × 3.77, · · · } and .77, 4.41, 5.15, 5.97, 6.91, 7.99, 11.04, 4.11×3.77 , · · · }. This time path is counterfactual in the sense that no technological advance is assumed to take place after 7 periods (or after 1940). The sudden death in technological progress doesn't appear to do any damage to the analysis.
The upshot of this experiment is presented in Figure 2 . Both urban and rural fertility decline smoothly between 1800 and 1940, much like the data. The share of manufacturing in employment rises in a steady fashion, too. Note that model has not reached its final steady state by 1940 (i.e., it takes longer than 7 periods for the model to converge).
IV. Postscript -Literature Review
The macroeconomics of population growth started with classic papers by Gary S. Becker and Robert J. Barro (1986) and Assaf Razin and Uri Ben-Zion (1975) .
The ∩-shaped pattern of fertility that has been observed over epochs in the Western world has been analyzed in interesting work by Oded Galor and David Weil (2000) .
Matthias Doepke (2000) has also examined the relationship between long-run growth and fertility. He studies the impact of education policies and child labor laws on fertility. Cristina Echevarria (1997) and John Laitner (2000) have developed wellknown models of secular sectoral shifts. The process of U.S. regional convergence, whereby the agricultural south caught up with the manufacturing north, has been modelled by Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman (2001) . In a sense the current work blends the fertility and sectoral shifts literature together. 
